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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
MUNICIPAL REGULATION AND TAXATION OF TRAILERS
AND TRAILER CAMPS UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
The development of defense activities and the decentralization and shifting
of industries are causing a readjustment of population which in turn results in a
serious housing shortage in many areas. Permanent homes are not available and
will not be available for some time. This is. causing a renewed interest in the use
of trailers.
The trailer industry today has developed into a $100,000,000 a year business
with more than 100 manufacturers producing 100,000 trailers annually. Am-
bitious advertising campaigns are being conducted to increase the number of trail-
ers in use beyond the estimated 550,000 which the Trailer Coach Manufacturers
have reported.' Eighty per cent of these trailers are in year-round or permanent
use. Many of them are housed in the more than 5000 trailer camps in the country.
This sudden expansion in a field which is scarcely fifteen years old, has created
a great many complex problems both to trailer inhabitants and to the public at
large. The problems involved are first, the protection of the health, safety and gen-
eral welfare of the public and second, a valid means of collecting from trailer
dwellers their fair share toward the tax burden of the community.
Recent surveys have shown that a new type of slum is developing in many
trailer camps throughout the country. Thus far, civic officials have shown very
little cognizance of this danger that a slum may suddenly spring up in their locale.
The mobile nature of trailers is responsible for this threat of a swift transfor-
mation. It is extremely important that safeguards be set up in advance to remove
any such possibility. For, it is a difficult situation to alleviate once it has gained
a foothold because the law will generally not permit a retroactive effect to be given
to legislative enactments.
It is self-evident that house trailers in a community add new burdens to
municipal and school facilities and services. Although trailer folks are living in
homes, mobile though they be, the tax burden, for the most part, falls only on
owners of fixed houses.
The responsibility for the solutions to these problems is clearly a duty of
local government. Former Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois in vetoing two
bills which would have set up state licensing and regulation of trailer camps called
the bills "an usurpation by the state of what should be a function of local govern-
ment." Local machinery can better provide for the circumstances which are pe-
culiar to their neighborhood.
I Trailer-Coach Manufacturers Association, 20 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago 6, 11.
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This article will discuss the extent to which municipalities in Pennsylvania
may regulate trailers and trailer camps. It will further deal with the various methods
by which the local units, including school districts, may extract revenue from
trailer dwellers and-trailer camp owners.
REGULATION OF TRAILERS AND TRAILER CAMPS
(a) Police Power in General
A local government is the mere political subdivision of the state which is
set up for the purpose of exercising a part of the state's powers.2 It may exercise
only those powers which are expressly granted to it by the state or such as may b
necessarily implied from those granted. 8 As a necessary corollary of this rule, be-
fore any particular power may be delegated to the municipality, the state must
possess it. In addition, the power must be of such nature that the state is per-
mitted to delegate it.
The regulatory powers of the municipality fall within what is known as the
police power. Many attempts have been made to define this power. Some writ-
ers say it is always easier to determine whether a particular case comes within
the general scope of the power than to give an abstract definition of the power
itself, which will be accurate.4 When outlining its scope, most courts say that
municipal police power concerns immediate restrictions on the use of property
or acts of individuals detrimental to the public health, morals, or safety.5
The state has police power because, say the courts, the power is institutional
and inberent in government.6 No federal or Pennsylvania constitutional pro-
vision expressly mentions the power and yet no state to which this right and power
is denied has any real life. "It is much easier to perceive and realize the- existence
and source of this power than to mark its boundaries or prescribe limits to its
existence." 7
Tht police power may be delegated by the state to a municipal corporation
as a public function to be exercised within proper limits for all appropriate muni-
cipal purposes.8 The extent of this delegation of police power does not depend
upon the size of the city, borough or township, but upon the charter grant of pow-
ers. Therefore, we must see what powers have been given to municipalities by the
state.
2 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220 (1903); Palumbo Appeal, 166 Pa. Super. 557, 72 A.2d
789 (1950).
8 Ibid.
4 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879).
5 Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Phila., 301 Pa. 291, 152 A. 23 (1930).
6 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872).
7 Chief Justice Shaw so remarked in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53 (1851).
8 Ward's Appeal, 289 Pa. 458, 137 A. 630 (1927); Jenning's Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 198 A.
621 (1938).
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In Pennsylvania, the various City, Borough and Township Codes include the
police power in the corporate authority given to the municipality by the Com-
monwealth. So, the sole question now is one of determining what regulations
fall within the police power.
(b) Regulation of Trailers and Trailer Camps through Police Power
A municipal ordinance which absolutely prohibits the parking of any trailer
which can be used for living quarters or the maintenance of any trailer camp with-
in the municipal limits is arbitrary and unreasonable and amounts to the depriva-
tion of property without due process of law.9 On the other hand, regulation under
authorized exercise of police power is ,due process even though property or a
business is taken or destroyed. 10
(1) Regulation through Building Codes and Zoning Ordinances. Many
municipalities consider house trailers, for the purpose of regulation, to be perma-
nent single-famliy dwellings, i.e., realty, if parked for more than a stated length
of time." However, a taxing ordinance attempting to treat house trailers parked
for more than a stated length of time as realty would apparently be unconsti-
tutional.' 2 When considered as permanent single-family dwellings, such units
must comply with all municipal regulations for permanent houses as set out in
the building code and zoning ordinance. 3 A trailer camp which had a greater
density of population than allowed by a zoning ordinance was recognized as a
non-conforming use and it was held that there was no right to replace trailers as
the existing ones moved.14 However, any attempt to apply such provisions retro-
actively may be unconstitutional. 5 The court also upheld a township ordinance
requiring a certain amount of floor space downstairs and held it applied to trail-
ers.16 Any regulations found in such codes or ordinances that are considered rea-
sonable as to conventional homes, i.e., within t'he police power, it seems would
be upheld as valid if enforced against trailers and trailer camps.
(2) Regulation through Licensing. Probably the most effective means of reg-
ulation and the one generally used by" municipalities to regulate trailer camps, is
the licensing device. Ordinarily, items such as construction, alteration, sanitation,
water supply, toilet facilities and drainage are included in licensing ordinances.
In addition, they usually provide that before such license will be issued, sufficient
9 Commonwealth v. Amos, 44 D. & C. 125 (Pa., 1942).
10 White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926) ; Miller v. Quigg, 87 Fla. 462, 100 So. 270
(1924).
11 Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35 (1946).
12 Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. 363, 19 A. 138 (1890); In re Petition of Harry B. Mason, 75 D. & C.
1, 42 Munic. L. J. 65 (Pa., 1950). See Streyle v. Board of Property Assessment (Allegheny County),
100 P. L.J. 182 (Pa., 1952). An appeal to this decision is pending before the Pennsylvania Super-
ior Court.
18 See n. 11, supra.
14 In the Matter of Commonwealth of Pa., ex rel. Township of Lawrence Park v. Charles Hel-
muth, Jr., 73 D. & C. 370, 41 Munic. L.J. 248 (Pa., 1949).
15 Commonwealth v. Briggs, 72 D. & C. 437, 42 Munic. L.J. 135 (Pa., 1949).
16 Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, Appellant, 168 Pa. Super. 442, 78 A. 80 (1951).
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facilities must be provided to fulfill the requirements as to the matters listed
in the preceding sentence. In Crawford et al v. Wesleyville,17 the court upheld
regulation of a trailer camp by the licensing device. The court reasoned that the
hazards were created by a trailer camp owner for business purposes. In this same
case, regulation of an individual who kept a trailer on his own land was not al-
lowed on the theory that ownership of one's home is an absolute right. Note that
the ordinance in each case was discriminatory to trailer dwellers since it applied
to them alone and not to conventional house owners. The discrimination was con-
sidered reasonable, so to speak, when applied to a trailer camp owner but not
when applied to the individual parking on his own land. Similar reasoning has
been used to sustain regulation through license in the case where a home is taken
out of the ordinary category, i.e. where it is used for such commercial enterprise
as a boarding house or rooming house.18
Such an ordinance requiring the trailer camp owner to obtain a license is not
in violation of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, nor in violation of
the XIV amendment of the Constitution of the United States.19 For when trailers
are parked in trailer camps with no sanitary means of waste disposal, no water
supply connection, no collection of and disposal of garbage and refuse, they are
a menace to public health, unsightly and may detract from and depreciate sur-
rounding property and buildings. What could be more within the police power
than such exercise of authority by the municipality? The license is a convenient
means of enforcing the regulations.
However, the court in Palumbo's Appeal,20 based its decision on the theory
that a reasonable license fee might be imposed if the trailer camp created muni-
cipal expense. This reasoning could apparently be used to sustain regulations by
licensing as to individuals.
In light of the reasoning used in the above decisions, what would the result
be in the situation where the owner of a plot of ground subdivided it into small
lots and sold them to trailer owners? Would the hazard not be as great as
it is in the situation where the owner of the similar plot rents the same size space
to trailer owners? Literal compliance with the rule of the Crawford2' decision
would apparently prevent a municipality from regulating the individual lot own-
ers by the licensing device.
SPECIAL METHODS OF REVENUE RAISING
The discussion under this section will apply not only to Pennsylvania city,
borough and township government powers but will also include the extent to
17 Crawford et al. v. Wesleyville, 68 D. & C. 215, 42 Munic. L.J. 15 (Pa., 1949).
18 Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318 (1905).
19 See n. 17, supra.
20 Palumbo Appeal, 166 Pa. Super. 557, 72 A.2d 789 (1950).
21 See n. 17 supra.
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which school districts may go in obtaining revenue from trailer inhabitants and
trailer camp owners.
Revenue is needed for municipalities and school districts to carry out the
corporate functions given to them. How is such money to be obtained? A local
government can levy no taxes unless the power has been conferred by the state
iegislature upon municipal corporations for the purpose of obtaining means of
nforcing all proper objects of government.
22
Various methods of gaining revenue from these trailer folks have been at-
tempted. They are:
(a) Assessing and taxing the trailer as realty.
(b) A tax based upon the so-called "tax anything" statute.
(c) Extracting license fees under the police power.
(a) Assessing and Taxing the Trailer as Realty
The state legislature has conferred the general power to tax realty upon
municipalities and school districts. Therefore, the only question we need answer
is whether a trailer ever becomes real property.
Obviously, before we are able to apply a real property tax, we must be able
to determine just when a trailer loses its identity as personal property and becomes
realty. The answer-given to this question by the courts is "when such trailer be-
comes permanently affixed to the land so as to become a permanent place of abode
or habitation." 23 But this does not help much. When does such trailer become
permanently affixed to the land? Cases have held that the placing of blocks oz
jacks under the trailer and the connection of flexible tubing and rubber hoses
to bring in water and permit sewage disposal, of itself, does not constitute a suf-
ficient manifestation of intent to attach to the freehold.2 4 Mere physical annexa-
tion therefore is not the test. A house trailer is a vehicle and as such remains per-
sonal property unless the owner by some act permanently attaches it to the land
so as to justify the conclusion that be intended it to be considered real property.25
It is a question of intention. One court went so far as to say whether attached
to the realty or not, or in whatever manner attached, is immaterial where the par-
ties agree to consider it personal property.26 Purchasing registration plates for
the trailer tends to rebut any intention to permanently affix. 2"
The cases have not permitted a municipal government or a school district to
add the value of the trailer to the assessed valuation of the land on which the
22 Breitinger v. City of Philadelphia, 363 Pa. 512, 70 A.2d 640 (1950); Hillman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Jenner Twp., Somerset County, 300 Pa. 108, 150 A. 293 (1930).
23 In re. the Petition of Harry B. Mason, 75 D. & C. 1, 42 Munic.'L.J. 65 (Pa., 1950).
24 Streyle v. Board of Property Assessment (Allegheny Co.), 100 L.J. 182 (Pa., 1952). An ap-
peal to this decision is pending before the Superior Court.
5 Vail v. Weaver, 132 Pa. 363, 19 A. 138 (1890).




trailer is parked if the owner of the trailer is a different person from the owner
of the land. 28 No court has discussed whether such trailers could be assessed as
real estate in the name of the owner of the trailer. However, the reasonable mean-
ing to be taken from the holdings would seem to be that where there is a divided
ownership, the court finds as a fact that there is no intention to permanently
affix to the realty. Thus, the trailer cannot be considered as realty and an assess-
ment of it as such would be invalid regardless of in whose name assessed. None
of these statements preclude assessing a trailer as part of the realty if the same
person owns both the trailer and the land and the requisite intent is present.
Thus, two elements must concur before a real property assessment can be
placed on a trailer:
(1) the parking of the trailer on the land, and
(2) the intent to permanently affix.
(b) Revenue Raising Based Upon "tax anything" Statute
In 1947, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute, popularly known as
the "tax anything" statute, which delegated extensive taxing powers to cities of
the second class, second class A, and third class, boroughs, towns, townships of
the first class and school districts of the second, third and fourth classes. The
statute 9 provides:
"...(that they) may in their discretion, by ordinance or resolution,
for general revenue purposes, levy, assess and collect or provide for the
levying, assessment and collection of such taxes on persons, transactions,
occupations, privileges, subjects and personal property within the limits
of such political subdivisions, as they shall determine."
A general restriction has been placed on the exercise of this power which is
as follows:
"(A) That such local authorities shall not have authority by virtue
of this act (1) to levy, assess and collect or provide for the levying, assess-
ment and collection of any tax on a privilege, transaction, subject, occu-
pation or personal property which is now or does hereafter become sub-
ject to a State tax or license fee;."
An amendment passed in 1951 sets forth specific situations where second
class townships may levy a tax; a limitation was also placed on the exercise of this
power in addition to the general restriction above. The amendment is as follows:
"Subject to the limitations of this act, the duly constituted author-
ities of townships of the second class may, in their discretion, by ordi-
nance or resolution, for general revenue purposes, levy, assess and col-
lect, or provide for the levying, assessment and collection of, any one
or more of the following taxes, within the limits of said townships. ..
(4) A tax on the use or occupancy of house trailers suitable for living
quarters."
28 Ibid.
29 Act of 1947, June 25, P.L. 1145, 53 P.S. 2015.1 as amended.
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(B) "No taxes shall be levied by any political subdivision on the fol-
lowing subjects exceeding the rates specified in this subsection:... (g)
On use or occupany of house trailers suitable for living quarters, in town-
ships of the second class, $10."
Clearly, this statute permits a tax on the privilege to use or occupy house
trailers suitable for living quarters.80 A township of the second class, which has
not been delegated any powers under the general provisions of this statute, has,
by an amendment in 1951 been expressly permitted to so do. Certainly this indi-
cates a legislative intent favorable to such action. A lower court case8l decided
in Delaware County is an indication that the courts will go along with such an
interpretation of the statute. There a school district placed a flat levy of $3 per
month on all trailers used for dwelling purposes after the said trailer has remained
in the school district for a period of more than 29 days. This ordinance was held
as being within the statute.
Two other issues were raised in the Delaware County case. The first ques-
tioned the right to place a flat levy. The defendant contended such action vio-
lated the constitutional provision requiring uniformity of taxation. Secondly,
it was contended that the tax was invalid because the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania had already imposed a license fee upon each of the trailers in ques-
tion under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code of 1929, 32 thus falling under
one of the restrictions of their power to tax which have been previously set out.
In answer to the first contention, the court conceded that a tax imposed on
personal property as such would have to be imposed on an ad valorem (according
to the value) basis; but since this was a tax imposed on a privilege to use prop-
erty in a certain manner, a flat levy would be valid.
The second question was answered by merely examining the Motor Vehicle
Code. By express words, the court said in quoting from the statute, "The license
fee exacted under the provisions is for 'the use of highways and the operation
of vehicles upon the highways of this Commonwealth.' " The resolution in ques-
tion only taxed the use of a trailer for dwelling purposes. Therefore, the tax
was not in conflict with the Commonwealth's license fee and was valid.
Suppose a borough and school district, which are geographically identical,
both place a tax on this privilege to use or occupy a trailer? Would this be "double
taxation"? In a similar case decided in 1949 in which a wage tax was imposed
under this tax statute by both a borough and a school district, it was held that
there was no double taxation. 38 The reaon given was that the same tax was not im-
posed by the same taxing power upon the same subject matter. Therefore, it would
seem that both units could tax the same privilege.
30 In re William Akers, Jr. Co., 121 F.2d 846, 135 A.L.R. 1503 (1941).
81 Appeal from Tax on Trailers, 37 Del. 284, 42 Munic. L.J. 12 (Pa., 1950).
32 Act of 1929, May 1, P.L. 1005, 75 P.S. 861 and the following sections.
83 Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Thomas, 165 Pa. Super. 199, 67 A.2d 754 (1949).
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The maximum amount of tax which would be considered valid and reasonable
is a matter of speculation except in the instances where the statute expressly sets
the limit. The limitation on trailer taxation refers only to second class townships.
It limits them to a $10 maximum. A school tax of $3 per month on all trailers used
for dwelling purposes was held valid and reasonable in the one decision handed
down on a trailer tax based on this statute.
84
(c) License lees under the Police Power
A substantial amount of revenue can be raised by municipalities through the
imposition of license fees upon owners of trailer camps as a necessary incident of
the police power. School districts do not have police power; therefore, this method
of revenue raising is not open to them. A trailer camp, it would seem, can safely
be defined as, any site, lot, field, or tract of ground upon which are placed two or
more trailer coaches at least one of which belongs to a person other than the own-
er of the realty. 84a An individual trailer owner clearly is not included in this defi-
nition. The short-comings of attempting to place the requirement of a license upon
such individuals were set out under the discussion of trailer regulation in this
article. 35
There is nothing improper about the requirement of a license fee. 386 How-
ever, lack of regulatory provisions or an excessive fee would unquestionably in-
validate the ordinance as an improper exercise of the police power and stamp it
as a mere revenue raising measure.3T
A license fee differs from a tax in that the latter is imposed solely for the
raising of revenue. 38 Determination of whether it is one or the other, must be
made by looking at its incidents and from the natural and legal effect of the lang-
uage employed in the ordinance and not by the name by which it is described or
by the mode adopted in fixing the amount.8 9 If it is clearly a tax, it will be so
regarded, even though in form it is a license fee.
While a revenue tax cannot be imposed under the guise of a police regula-
tion, where unusual demands are made on a municipality's facilities by reason of
the conducting of a trailer camp, a reasonable charge, i.e., a licensee fee, may be
made to cover the expenses in providing such services. 40 Such items as additional
police and fire protection, installation of new playgrounds, increased sewage and
84 See n. 31, supra.
84a Such definition should avoid the constitutional objection found by the court in Crawford et
al. v. Wesleyville, see n. 17, supra.
86 See n. 17, supra.
86 See n. 17, supra; See n. 20, supra.
87 Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Sharon, 371 Pa. 609, 92 A.2d 222 (1952).
88 Pittsburgh Milk Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 360 Pa. 360, 62 A.2d 49 (1948).
89 Flynn v. Horst, 356 Pa. 20, 51 A.2d 54 (1947).
40 Pa. Liquor Control Board v. Publicker, 347 Pa. 555, 32 A.2d 914 (1943); Win. Laubach S
Sons v. Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A.2d 881 (1943); Palumbo Appeal, 166 Pa. Super. 557, 72 A.2d
789 (1950).
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garbage removal plus administrative expenses in carrying out the ordinance have
been upheld as services necessitated under proper exercise of police power.41
The measure of the reasonableness of the charge is not the amount actually
expended by the municipality in a particular year. A reasonable latitude must be
given in fixing charges to cover anticipated expenses. Any doubts should be re-
solved in favor of the municipality.42
For it to be considered a police measure, provisions must be included in the
ordinance for supervision and regulation. Provision for fine and imprisonment
for those without a license or who otherwise violate any provisions of the ordi-
nance is additional proof that the ordinance is a license act and not a mere tax on
business or property.
48
A municipality should avoid permitting the enforcement of the licenst fee
to be exercised by the agency which is used to collect taxes. Thus, it would ot be
feasible to provide that the tax collector should collect the license fee. The build-
ing inspector would be the logical person in this case to collect such fees. The en-
forcement of the license fee by such official would strengthen the municipalities'
argument that this is primarily a regulatory measure rather than a method of rais-
ing revenue."
In the broad sense, every ordinance which requires the payment of money is
a revenue-producing measure and commonly is'looked upon as a tax; but the pri-
mary purpose for ordinances such as this, is the reimbursement of the munici-
pality for providing special services required by' the licensees. There is nothing im-
proper about requiring the payment of a license fee in this instance.46
CONCLUSIONS
When then is the extent to which a Pennsylvania municipality may regulate
and raise revenue from trailers and trailer camps within its boundaries?
It would seem that municipalities may regulate trailers through:
(1) Building Codes and Zoning Ordinances
(a) The trailer must be considered realty, however, for such an
ordinance to be applicable, to it.
(b) These would apply to trailers and trailer camps alike.
(2) Ordinances imposing license fees
41 See n. 17, supra.
42 Pa. Liquor Control Board v. Publicker, 347 Pa. 555, 32 A.2d 914 (1943) ; Kittanning Borough
v. American Natural Gas Co., 239 Pa. 210, 86 A. 717 (1913).
43 See n. 40, supra.
44 Judge Cardozo in International Text-Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N.Y. 313, 115 N.E. 914 (1917).
Quoted favorably in 356 Pa. 20.
45 Pa. Liquor Control Board v. Publicker, 347 Pa. 555, 32 A.2d 914 (1943); Palumbo Appeal,
166 Pa. Super. 557, 72 A.2d 789 (1950).
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(a) This type of regulation would stem to be applicable to trailer
camps only.
Methods of raising revenue that municipalities and school districts can use in
trailer cases are as follows:
(1) Real property tax
(a) The trailer must be permanently "annexed" to the land.
(b) Only individuals who affix their own trailer to their own land,
it would seem, can be taxed in this way.
(c) Municipalities and school districts can assess this tax.
(2) Ordinances and resolutions passed under authority of "tax anything"
statute.
(a)l No need for trailer to be considered realty here.
(b) Municipalities and school districts can assess this tax.
(3) License fees extracted under the police power
(a) Municipalities alone can ust this method.
(b) The fee must be reasonable in that it must be commensurate
with the cost burden placed upon the municipality.
(c) It would seem that only trailer camp owners can be required
to submit to this licensing.
James H. Murray
Member of the Senior Class
